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Publics in history 
MUSTAFA EMIRBAYER and MIMI SHELLER 
New Schoolfor Social Research; Lancaster University 
Are the concepts of civil society and the public sphere "morally admirable 
but analytically useless," as some skeptics have argued? In this article, 
we seek to prove such skeptics wrong. We outline a program for em- 
pirical research that proceeds from current work on those topics, much 
of it theoretical and normative; our argument unfolds in several steps. 
First, we aim systematically to inject the idea of an associational civil 
society, distinguished theoretically from economic and political insti- 
tutions, into debates in sociological analysis. Civil society has, in our 
view, been rendered a residual category within currently influential 
trends in empirical research that focus instead upon one or both of 
two "master processes" in modern history: state formation and capitalist 
development. Our aim here is not to propose a new associational 
determinism to stand alongside and to compete with alternative political 
and economic determinisms, but rather, to carve out a new conceptual 
space for civil and associational relationships (and for the "publics" that 
emerge from within this space) and thereby to open up new ways of 
analyzing the complex and reciprocal determinations that obtain among 
associational life, the modern administrative-bureaucratic state, and 
the capitalist economy.2 
Second, we explore in greater detail the different categories of net- 
works of publicity that are rooted within civil society, networks that, 
more specifically, aim to extend the sway of (certain tendencies within) 
associational life over and across the major institutional sectors of 
modern society. In particular, we examine three distinct "interfaces" 
of publicity: one with the state ("political publics"), another with the 
economy ("economic publics"), and one that is reflexive: communica- 
tive networks that turn critical attention back upon and, ideally but 
not necessarily, aim further to democratize civil society itself ("civil 
publics"). (It is necessary to discuss civil society before turning to 
Theory and Society 28: 145-197, 1999. 
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publicity precisely because of the intricacies of the relationship between 
the two concepts.) Along the way, we consider the internal differentia- 
tion of publics along two dimensions, one reflecting power asymmetries 
and the other a continuum of time-space distanciation. In addition, we 
discuss the implications of our conceptualization of publics for the 
study of social movements. 
Third, we lay out a series of propositions for converting this two-fold 
model of institutional spheres and extra-institutional ("interstitial") 
networks of publicity into a systematic program for empirical research. 
(This endeavor takes up the latter half of our article.) Drawing upon a 
lengthy tradition of inquiry into the multiple contexts of empirical 
social action,3 we outline a new multidimensional approach to the 
study of publicity, one that analytically disaggregates publics into their 
three constituent dimensions - patterns of relationships at the levels of 
social structure, culture, and social psychology - as well as into differ- 
ent modalities of human agency. We cross-fertilize this approach with 
ideas and techniques from currently influential "relational" schools of 
research,4 yielding four empirical strategies for the investigation of 
interactional patterns within and across publics: 
* The social-structural context of action: social-network analysis. 
* The cultural context of action: the new cultural sociology and cul- 
tural history; discourse analysis; and sociolinguistics. 
* The social-psychological context of action: object-relations psycho- 
analysis; the new literature on trust and other recent work on collec- 
tive emotional transactions and group dynamics. 
* Human agency: new approaches to identifying agentic orientations 
and temporal frameworks. 
We show how these modes of inquiry might fruitfully be applied to the 
empirical study of publics (both singular and plural) across a wide 
range of historical and institutional settings. We examine how public 
actors engage with their relational contexts often in widely varying 
ways (including within social movements), in the process helping both 
to reproduce and to transform the networks of publicity within which 
they find themselves, as well as (ultimately) the state, economy, and 
civil society itself. 
The following substantive issues emerge for us as particularly salient: 
Can changes in economic or political organizations, or even both, con- 
duce to democracy in the absence of a self-organized citizenry, or an 
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autonomous associational realm (civil society)? Is the existence of an 
autonomous civil society itself sufficient for democratization, or is it 
more a question of what kinds of bridging structures, mediating prac- 
tices, and channels for communication will prevail there? How are 
institutions within the economy, state, or civil society affected (in 
democratic or anti-democratic ways) by emergent patterns of alliance 
or conflict among public networks? How do the social-structural, 
cultural, or social-psychological dimensions of such networks con- 
strain and enable public actors' relations with one another and their 
capacities to influence institutional settings? And what role do the 
"micro-dynamics" of public actors' engagements with one another and 
with their situational contexts, and (in turn) the "macro-dynamics" of 
singular and multiple publics' interactions with large-scale social in- 
stitutions, play in historical struggles over democratization? 
We contend that the research program and conceptual synthesis we are 
presenting here are long overdue, since for many years now the up- 
surge of interest among political sociologists in ideas from the Haber- 
masian tradition of critical theory (which helped to reintroduce the 
concepts of civil society and the public sphere into sociological in- 
quiry) has, with but occasional exceptions, failed to leave much of a 
mark upon long-established currents in historical-comparative sociol- 
ogy and social-movement theory. In part, this is due to the institutional 
topographies that historical-comparative sociologists and social-move- 
ment researchers themselves have relied upon for guidance, but in part 
also to the inability of analysts interested in civil society and publicity 
to move beyond the normative level by incorporating research tech- 
niques and insights from empirical sociology. A renovated approach to 
the study of publics in history will thus not only fill an important void 
in the literature on civil society and the public sphere, but also intro- 
duce in a more compelling way the promising insights of this largely 
normative tradition into empirically oriented social and historical in- 
quiry.5 
Civil society and publicity 
Since their resurgence in the 1960s, historical-comparative sociology and 
social-movement research have been largely oriented around two master 
concepts: the administrative-bureaucratic state and capitalist social 
relations. Throughout this period, classes and class conflict have been 
the guiding notions behind a good deal of Marxist scholarship, on such 
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fundamental issues as state-building, democratization, and capitalist 
development.6 States as autonomous organizations with their own 
distinctive goals and interests - and the complex interactions of these 
states with economic actors and class structures - have also been 
critical concerns for the new "state-centered" sociology.7 Charles Tilly's 
programmatic remarks in Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Com- 
parisons aptly summarize the current state of the field: "In the case of 
Western countries over the last few hundred years, the program [of the 
new historical-comparative sociology and of social-movement re- 
search] begins by recognizing that the development of capitalism and 
the formation of powerful, connected national states dominated all 
other social processes and shaped all social structures.... It goes on 
by following the creation and destruction of different sorts of struc- 
tures by capitalism and statemaking, then tracing the relationship of 
other processes ... to capitalism and statemaking."8 
Not included in this research program - at least not explicitly - has 
been another important context for social interaction, located "in 
between" states and economic relations (of production as well as ex- 
change), and organized around the principles of solidarity and (demo- 
cratic) communication: the associational networks of civil society. 
In what follows, we survey some highly influential approaches in 
historical-comparative sociology and social-movement research that, 
while pointing in the direction of civil society, still treat it as a residual 
category. Our aim is not to suggest that no useful research has been 
conducted into the dynamics of civil society in these various approaches 
(such is hardly the case), but rather, to demonstrate how these research 
agendas say a great deal about civil society, but without ever specifi- 
cally employing that category. In later sections, we begin to argue 
for an alternative approach to institutions and extra-institutional 
processes. Such an approach deliberately reserves an important place 
for civil society (and for publics) alongside states and economies and 
thereby allows for greater precision in empirical research, as well as for 
enhanced normative leverage in the critique of undemocratic historical 
developments. 
Dualistic perspectives and their limitations 
One set of researchers approaches the analysis of non-state and non- 
economic networks of interaction from a point of view based in devel- 
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opments in the modern capitalist economy. By focusing upon class- 
based shared experiences and ways of life, neo-Marxist writers such as 
E. P. Thompson rewardingly shift attention away from "purely" eco- 
nomic developments in the direction of "working-class institutions - 
trade unions, friendly societies, educational and religious movements, 
political organizations, periodicals - [as well as] working-class intellec- 
tual traditions, working-class community patterns, and a working-class 
structure of feeling." 9 Going further, Ira Katznelson and Aristide Zol- 
berg disaggregate the "unsorted kitbag of findings" left by Thompson's 
synthesis of structure and agency by suggesting a four-fold distinction 
among "levels of class" that allows "us to specify more precisely the 
points of connection between the structure of class relations at the 
macroeconomic level; the lived experience of class in the workplace 
and in the residence community; groups of people disposed to act in 
class ways; and class-based collective action."'0 Despite its positive 
recognition of the relevance of associational life, however, class for- 
mation in this model still encompasses all aspects of the social organ- 
ization of life, thereby foreclosing the possibility of analyzing linkages 
(possibly of tension and contradiction) between economy-based rela- 
tionships and alternative modalities of civil association. At a still deeper 
level, moreover, the Katznelson-Zolberg model - much like the class- 
based strategy of Thompson himself - continues to regard capitalist 
development as the primary determinant of all historical change.1" 
Jean Cohen's verdict here is absolutely compelling: economy-centered 
researchers, while recognizing civil society (and publics) empirically as 
crucial elements in the historical equation, analytically submerge them 
within the unfolding class dynamics of the capitalist system by obscur- 
ing "the complex character of the social sphere" and reducing it to "the 
surface expression of relations of production, as class relations." 12 
From the opposite direction, meanwhile, state-centered researchers 
such as Theda Skocpol increasingly call attention to the "explanatory 
centrality [of states] ... as potent and autonomous organizational ac- 
tors." 13 They raise the Weberian questions of state autonomy and state 
capacity vis-a-vis "the demands or interests of social groups, classes, 
or society,"14 as well as the Tocquevillean question of how state struc- 
tures and activities help to shape the "societal" realm itself.15 While 
highly useful for explaining certain kinds of historical problems, this 
state-centered analytical strategy (like its class-oriented counterpart) 
still often undertheorizes the potentially important distinction (within 
its broad, overarching category of "society") between economic class 
structures, on the one hand, and associational relations of social life, 
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on the other. It remains content to take the dichotomy of "state vs. 
society" as its theoretical point of departure, without disaggregating 
"society" itself into its distinct analytical components. In both para- 
digms, "societal" groups are seen as oriented more toward the accumu- 
lation of economic benefits (through markets) or special privileges and 
entitlements (through state policies) than also (or potentially) the ex- 
pansion of free spaces for popular participation, voluntary associa- 
tion, and self-expression. "With respect to all that is nonstate," note 
two recent critics, "the new [statist] paradigm [continues] the reduc- 
tionist tendency of Marxism and neo-Marxism by identifying class 
relations and interests as the key to... collective action. Moreover, the 
legal, associational, cultural, and public spheres of society have no 
theoretical place in this analysis."16 
Countering the blind-spots of both economy- and state-centered per- 
spectives, a third set of researchers thematize precisely these "free 
spaces" of popular participation. Focusing upon the "vast middle 
ground of communal activity, between private life and large-scale in- 
stitutions," Sara Evans and Harry Boyte identify free spaces "by their 
roots in community, the dense, rich networks of daily life; by their 
autonomy; and by their public or quasi-public character as participa- 
tory environments which nurture values associated with citizenship 
and a vision of the common good."17 They draw upon civic republican 
concepts to emphasize the cultivation of "public vitality," "egalitari- 
anism," and "democratic values" that outweigh pure class interest or 
the pursuit of state power. This notion of extra-institutional free spaces 
informs a great deal of recent social-movement research, on everything 
from the "sequestered social spaces" and "local movement centers" of 
the civil rights movement18 to the women-only spaces of the feminist 
movement,19 as well as various kinds of "spatial preserves" or "pro- 
tected spaces" within Communist or Islamic fundamentalist states.20 
Despite these positive and empirically fruitful moves beyond the limi- 
tations of the former perspectives, however, the free spaces approach 
itself remains trapped within some of the same dualistic presuppositions 
that privilege class relations or state organization. Free spaces puta- 
tively emerge out of a Habermasian lifeworld consisting of communal 
traditions, psychological orientations, and "direct, face-to-face, and 
egalitarian relationships."21 Thus, they differ qualitatively and concep- 
tually from the impersonal macro-institutions of state and economy. 
Such a theorization forecloses the possibility of exploring on an equal 
footing the linkages and tensions among the state, economy, and asso- 
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ciational modes of social organization, not to mention the complex 
dynamics that might obtain within and between different kinds of free 
spaces. Although they take a stab at differentiating the "richness and 
vitality of public life in free spaces" from the "static and thin quality of 
'public' in reactionary protests," Evans and Boyte also undertheorize 
the actual structural make-up of associational life, in all its social- 
structural, cultural, and social-psychological dimensions. They offer 
little actual guidance for empirical research.22 
Civil society and democracy 
Following upon a line of theorists of structural differentiation from 
G.W. F. Hegel, Emile Durkheim, and Talcott Parsons to Jiirgen Haber- 
mas, we contend that the state, economy, and civil society are realms of 
social life whose relative independence from one another constitutes 
one of the principal hallmarks of modernity. Many of the dynamics of 
contemporary society are captured in the relations among these empir- 
ically interpenetrating and yet analytically distinct institutional domains. 
In particular, we focus upon the institutional sector that, metaphori- 
cally speaking, lies "in between" the state and economy. Jean Cohen 
and Andrew Arato provide the best point of departure for such a 
venture; in their important treatise, Civil Society and Political Theory, 
they define civil society as a domain of interaction revolving around 
the following organizing key principles: "(1) Plurality: families, infor- 
mal groups, and voluntary associations whose plurality and autonomy 
allow for a variety of forms of life; (2) Publicity: institutions of culture 
and communication; (3) Privacy: a domain of individual self-develop- 
ment and moral choice; and (4) Legality: structures of general laws 
and basic rights needed to demarcate plurality, privacy, and publicity 
from at least the state and, tendentially, the economy."23 Each of these 
four dimensions varies independently of the others, and may be more 
or less democratic in different civil societies. (We foreground the ideas 
of plurality, privacy, and legality in the present section and have much 
more to say about publicity in the remainder of the article.) The growth 
and contraction of civil society occurs unevenly, at different rates in 
each of its constituent elements, and at sub-national as well as national 
levels. Hence the rich texture of variation we find in democratic soci- 
eties, both past and present. 
The above conceptualization of civil society is certainly controversial. 
In the lengthy history of the term (a history we shall not recapitulate 
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here, given its extensive treatment elsewhere24), the concept has vari- 
ously been defined to include all of social life under conditions of 
liberal democracy (e.g., nineteenth-century England as a "civil soci- 
ety"); all of social life outside of the state, but including the capitalist 
economy; less expansively, the realm of sociability (or the "lifeworld"); 
and, finally, the "societal community," as it has been conceptualized by 
Parsons. Our own theory, much like that of Cohen and Arato, stakes 
out an intermediate position relative to these others; it sees civil society 
as an institutional complex narrower than society as a whole (and 
excluding the economy), but broader than "the social" or "lifeworld" 
taken alone: civil society entails "a particular angle of looking at this 
[life]world from the point of view of conscious association building and 
associational life."25 We also define civil society more broadly than 
Parsons's societal community; in fact, for us, civil society encompasses 
both his "integrative" and "latent pattern maintenance" subsystems - 
domains that, together with the state and economy, constitute Parsons's 
celebrated four-fold model of the social system. These two categories 
include both "willed communities"26 and voluntary associations, on 
the one hand, and families, schools, churches, and other cultural or 
socializing institutions, on the other.27 
Important for the proper conceptualization of civil society is the notion 
of "fundamental rights," which serve to reaffirm and stabilize the rela- 
tive autonomy gained by civil society vis-a-vis the state and economy, 
as well as to safeguard democratic advances achieved within civil 
society itself.28 By fundamental rights, we mean rights that are "fully 
actionable, limitable only by another right, and universal in [their] 
application (i.e., not related to the characteristics of a particular group 
but pertaining to individuals as such)."29 Such rights are "created and 
defended from below," often by social movements emerging from within 
civil society, and are distinct from entitlements, benefits, or privileges, 
including some (but not all) of T. H. Marshall's "social rights," whose 
"exercise does not depend primarily on the free activity of their benefi- 
ciaries."30 While guaranteed by positive law and enforced by state 
power, they owe their origins and validity ultimately to civil society 
itself: "In the domain of rights, law secures and stabilizes what has 
been achieved by social actors in civil society."31 By implication, then, 
the state, while not the ultimate source of fundamental rights, is not 
inherently their enemy, either; it is no more an evil to be kept at bay 
than civil society is itself necessarily a good. Often, in fact, "civil society, 
[if] left to itself, generates radically unequal power relationships, which 
only state power can challenge.... [T]he state is an indispensable agent 
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- even if the associational networks also, always, resist the organizing 
impulses of state bureaucrats." 32 
The concept of fundamental rights helps to situate the empirical anal- 
ysis of civil society against a backdrop of normative perspectives on 
liberalism and citizenship, from within moral and political philosophy. 
Indeed, there is a deep elective affinity between the civil society concept 
and ideas of democracy that stand similarly halfway between normative 
and empirical points of view. Tilly provides one such "intermediate" 
conceptualization of democracy, as "broad and relatively equal citizen- 
ship with (a) binding consultation of citizens in regard to state personnel 
and policies as well as (b) protection of citizens from arbitrary state 
action."33 This goes a long way toward clarifying both normative 
standards against which to judge prevailing arrangements within civil 
society (since, once again, such arrangements may fall well short of 
being fully democratic) and empirical points of reference for compara- 
tive institutional analysis. Tilly's perspective, however, still calls for 
modification in two major respects. First, it must be emphasized that 
democracy is desirable at subnational as well as national levels (and in 
non-state settings): in trade unions, clubs, and churches, no less than in 
the polity as a whole. And second, it must be stressed that social life 
ideally fosters in citizens heightened degrees of civic commitment, 
reflexivity, and critically informed judgment - key elements (neglected 
by Tilly) in any satisfactory view of democracy. (We shall touch upon 
this again below, in our discussions of social psychology and agency.34) 
Robert Dahl's classic distinction between "polyarchy" and "full democ- 
racy" fills a crucial void here in Tilly's still-too-empiricist, insufficiently 
normative formulation.35 So, too, does Habermas's proceduralist view 
of democracy as a "multiplicity of communicative forms of rational 
political will-formation, [such as] fairly regulated bargaining processes 
and ... various forms of argumentation, including pragmatic, ethical, 
and moral discourses." For Habermas, "'dialogical' and 'instrumental' 
politics ... interpenetrate in the medium of deliberations of various 
kinds." 36 
As a unique bridging concept between the normative and the empiri- 
cal, the notion of civil society plays several potentially important roles 
in historical-comparative sociology and social-movement analysis, 
roles that complement (and, in many respects, parallel) those of the 
state and capitalist economy. For one thing, it allows historical re- 
searchers to explore the variable autonomy of actors within civil society 
(past and present) vis-a-vis both the economy (and class structure) and 
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the state. Indeed, it becomes possible to elaborate histories of the legal 
and associational structures of civil society that extend as far back as 
the medieval period and that complement existing histories of state 
formation and capitalist development. Margaret Somers even suggests 
that in certain parts of rural England, "[t]he pastoral rural political 
geography" inherited from the twelfth to thirteenth centuries "was in- 
dependent from elites, and pastoral associational life was autonomous 
and solidaristic." 37 The history of medieval cities is also relevant here, 
for it was precisely in these urbanized contexts - "islands within the 
feudal sea" - that "new ideas and practices could develop," as out- 
growths of "an acephalous world in which liberties were both widespread 
and firmly codified in a legal system that privileged corporate rights."38 
Indeed, the development of an autonomous legal system (together with 
rights of privacy) constitutes yet another key element in the story of 
civil society's emergence.39 
The civil society idea also makes possible the elaboration of cross- 
national comparisons even in the present day, comparisons focusing 
not only upon the self-defense of civil society vis-a-vis the state and 
capitalism, but also upon the internal democratization of civil society 
itself. Perhaps an analogue might even be developed here to Skocpol's 
influential research program on state structures, such that one could 
highlight the themes of civil autonomy and capacity, as well as how 
civil structures and activities help to (re-)shape the state and economy 
in turn. The lineaments of such an agenda can already be seen in recent 
writings on the voluntary sector "between states and markets" in West- 
ern Europe, the United States, Israel, and Japan,40 as well as in more 
specialized literatures on civil society in many and varied regions of the 
world: Western Europe,41 China,42 the former Soviet bloc,43 Latin 
America,44 the Middle East,45 and the United States.46 
The concept ofpublicity 
"Public sphere and civil society," as Craig Calhoun trenchantly observes, 
"are not precisely equivalent concepts."47 The "public sphere," to 
which we now turn, connotes a somewhat narrower, more interstitial 
mode of association than does the master concept of civil society. 
Several ways of conceptualizing it are now prevalent, which we draw 
upon and recombine in new ways. 
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In the Habermasian perspective, first set forth in a classic work of 
1962, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,48 publics 
signify rational-critical argumentation and collective will-formation 
regarding the paths along which the state, economy, and civil society 
itself are to develop. "By 'the public sphere' we mean first of all a realm 
of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can 
be formed. Access is guaranteed to all citizens.... Citizens behave as a 
public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion ... about 
matters of general interest."49 In Cohen and Arato's four-fold definition 
of civil society (quoted above), publicity entails the moment of open 
communication and popular participation through which alternative 
directions for social life are collectively reflected upon and adjudicated. 
Habermas's idea of the public sphere as the "operationalization of civil 
society's capacity for self-organization"50 plays an important role in 
our own account below. 
Another more recent conceptualization of publics distinguishes it even 
more sharply from the idea of civil society, while also providing a 
counterweight to Habermas's vision of a singular and universalistic 
public sphere. Nancy Fraser points out that actors communicate in 
different ways, depending upon their gender, race, class, ethnicity, and 
cultural backgrounds, practical differences evocative of Pierre Bourdieu's 
notion of "habitus."51 The capacity for rational-critical debate, from 
this perspective, is a kind of "linguistic capital" not equally available to 
all participants in a discursive field; speakers "lacking the legitimate 
competence are defacto excluded from the social domains in which this 
competence is required, or are condemned to silence."52 In contrast, 
more "performative" theories of publicity emphasize the corporeality 
of speaking, the symbolic dimensions of communication (including 
conflict, contradiction, and unpredictability), and a broader spectrum 
of types of communicative action: dramaturgical, artistic, expressive.53 
In relation to self-identified "black publics," for example, Paul Gilroy 
stresses "dramaturgy, enunciation, and gesture - the pre- and anti- 
discursive constituents of black metacommunication" - as major 
elements in the creation of black counterdiscourses.54 Performative 
theories of publicity also highlight the "dispersal of the agon," or 
multiple locations or moments of public debate,55 thereby providing 
links with historical analyses of working-class and non-literate pub- 
lics56 whose symbol-laden festivals, rowdy demonstrations, or irreverent 
word-play are largely overlooked in rational-critical understandings of 
public claim-making. 
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A third conceptualization of publicity further multiplies the locales 
of embodied public interaction, while additionally downplaying the 
normative overtones of Habermasian analyses. Harrison White defines 
publics as "interstitial social spaces which ease transitions between 
specific domains.... [A]ll publics are alike in decoupling actors from 
the pattern of specific relations and understandings embedded with[in] 
any particular domain and network."57 As liminal moments of transition 
between more stable "network-domains," a kind of "anti-structure," 58 
publics provide mechanisms for switching in and out of more established 
modalities of sociocultural interaction. White distinguishes among 
several distinct types of publics;59 whereas his constructs are not 
necessarily tied to any theory of democracy or rational-critical com- 
munication, they do reinforce the notion that publics are interstitial, 
widely varying in scope, size, and timing, and, above all, dynamic and 
interactional, rather than singular, reified entities. Publics not only 
permit collective direction-setting and problem-solving within civil 
society and other institutional spheres, but also serve crucial bridging 
functions between distinct networks configured over wide spatial as 
well as temporal spectrums. 
Our own understanding of publics derives significant features from all 
three of these analytical perspectives. We define publics as open-ended 
flows of communication that enable socially distant interlocutors to 
bridge social-network positions, formulate collective orientations, and 
generate psychical "working alliances," in pursuit of influence over 
issues of common concern.60 Publics are not simply "spaces" or 
"worlds" where politics is discussed, as the popular "public sphere" 
idea suggests, but rather, interstitial networks of individuals and 
groups acting as citizens. States, economies, and civil societies may all 
be relatively "bounded" and stable complexes of institutions, but pub- 
licity is emergent: "Societies have never been sufficiently institutional- 
ized to prevent interstitial emergence.... [U]nderneath, human beings 
are [always] tunneling ahead to achieve their goals, forming new net- 
works, extending old ones, and emerging most clearly into our view 
with rival configurations."61 Accordingly, public interactions can be 
said to transpire within a wide range of locales, from the agora to the 
salon, street, or cyberspace. Rather than "a space in any topograph- 
ical ... sense," a network of publicity can emerge within "a private 
dining room in which people gather to hear a "samizdat" or in which 
dissidents meet with foreigners.... [A] field or a forest can also become 
public space if it is the object and location of an action in concert, of a 
demonstration to stop the construction of a highway or a military air 
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base." 62 Of course, networks of publicity - precisely insofar as they are 
networks - can also be said to exhibit relatively stable features (in 
certain historical cases more than others). For this reason, one theorist 
has even dubbed them "extra-institutional institutions."63 (We explore 
this in greater detail below.) But the key point here is that publics stand 
in a dynamic and dialogical relationship to the relatively more institu- 
tionalized domains of social life. 
Importantly for our purposes, publics can even emerge within the 
interstices of the state or economy (as well as of civil society), as webs 
of critical discourse, public communication, and cooperative decision- 
making through which actors seek to extend the influence of certain 
tendencies already extant within civil society within and across more 
established institutions and institutional sectors. "[T]he mere existence 
(however inadequate) of parliaments and other forms of workshop 
self-management, codetermination, and collective bargaining," note 
Cohen and Arato, "indicates that publics can be constructed even 
within [state and economic] institutions.... These would and in some 
cases do constitute receptors for societal influence within the belly of 
the whale, as it were.... [T]he political issue is how to introduce public 
spaces into state and economic institutions ... by establishing continuity 
with a network of societal communication consisting of public spheres, 
associations, and movements."64 
In our view, however, publics are not only relational and interstitial; 
they are also (frequently) multiple. Fraser makes clear that a "post- 
bourgeois" model of publicity requires a plurality of competing "sub- 
altern counterpublics," which she defines as "parallel discursive arenas 
where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate 
counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their 
identities, interests, and needs."65 These multiple publics need not be 
deemed mere "enclaves" - "which is not to deny that they are often 
involuntarily enclaved" 66 - because by their very nature they imply (at 
least in part) a publicist orientation. "[T]o interact discursively as a 
member of [a] public, subaltern or otherwise, is to aspire to dissemi- 
nate one's discourse to ever widening arenas.... [H]owever limited a 
public may be in its empirical manifestation at any given time, its 
members understand themselves as part of a potentially wider public,... 
"the public at large".... On the one hand, [subaltern counterpublics] 
function as spaces of withdrawal and regroupment; on the other hand, 
they also function as bases and training grounds for agitational activities 
directed toward wider publics. It is precisely in the dialectic between 
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these two functions that their emancipatory potential resides." (Notice 
the close correspondence here to Evans and Boyte's concept of "free 
spaces.") In light of this insight, the challenge becomes to formulate 
a new "critical political sociology of a form of public life in which 
multiple but unequal publics participate." 67 
Arrays ofpublicity 
In subsequent sections, we lay out some of the key features of precisely 
such a political sociology. In the meantime, however, we offer three sets 
of distinctions that might help to provide an initial orientation toward 
the broad range of publics before us. The first of these regards power 
differences among public actors - and draws upon ideas from the 
performative model of publicity. Historical research often differentiates 
publics according to social class: the notion of "plebeian publics" even 
appears in the preface to Habermas's work on the bourgeois public 
sphere in Europe, although Habermas implies that the former flickered 
only briefly (and inconsequentially) during the French Revolution and 
British Chartism and largely dismisses them from his analysis. The 
work of Oskar Negt, Alexander Kluge, Gunther Lottes, and Geoff 
Eley has done much to bring questions of power asymmetries (and 
concepts such as plebeian or proletarian publicity) more squarely into 
discussions of publicity.68 It has become the basis for a radical rethink- 
ing of the history of publicity in Europe and elsewhere, one that takes 
into account not only working-class participation in politics and class 
struggle, but also (increasingly), other anti-hegemonic formations such 
as "black counterpublics."69 In what follows, we draw heavily upon 
this new approach, even as we aim to extend it well beyond its initial 
preoccupation with social-class differences. Specifically, we thematize 
power asymmetries that are grounded in the social-structural, cultural, 
as well as social-psychological contexts of action, which constrain and 
enable public action targeting variously the state, economy, as well as 
civil society itself (more on these distinctions below). We admit such 
asymmetries into the heart of our model because we recognize that 
"ideal speech situations"70 simply do not exist empirically, and that 
in fact democratic progress will require working across multiple differ- 
ences to achieve procedurally valid agreements. 
The second continuum along which we distinguish publics - here draw- 
ing upon White's model of interstitial publics - is that of time-space 
distanciation.71 We find it empirically useful to categorize publics in 
159 
terms of the "reach" they exercise across time and space, with some 
publics operating on a face-to-face basis, others extending access to 
unknown "outsiders" or "strangers," and others, the most far-reaching 
(and long-lasting) of all, using print or symbolic communication to 
disseminate information not only through spatially extensive networks, 
but also over long periods of time. (The related but distinct issues of 
timing and temporal turning-points are discussed below in the section 
on "agency.") Modern history has been deeply influenced by the rise of 
new technologies, sites, and media of communicative interaction. His- 
torians have explored the emergence of a literary public sphere, the 
commodification of news, the development of "print cultures," the 
expansion of reading publics, and the impact of all of the above upon 
"imagined communities."72 They have shown how literate publics 
based on technologies that increased time- and space-distanciation 
between speakers (authors), and audience (readers) were crucial to the 
development of both the modern individual self and the modern state 
and economy. (The rise of the new electronic media is merely the latest 
chapter in this ongoing story.73) This changing time-space distanciation 
of publicity has been a spur to intense contestation over the uneven 
spread of literacy, language rights for minority groups, access to different 
communication channels, and civil capacities for meeting, speaking, 
publishing, and broadcasting. How and where public communication 
occurs reveals a history of changing institutional settings that materi- 
ally shaped the nature of publics and the power of human actors to 
utilize publicity. 
Let us now introduce a third major categorial schema that intersects 
the two sets of distinctions delineated above. We contend that through 
networks of publicity the communicative impulses of (certain tenden- 
cies within) civil society have an impact upon the state and economy, 
as well as reflexively back upon civil society itself. Publics, in other 
words, are grounded within civil society (and often, although not 
always, concern themselves with its internal democratization), but can 
also mediate in two other directions, one aiming to influence political, 
and the other, economic structures.74 (Cohen and Arato make this 
point about publics channelling influence between civil society, on 
the one hand, and the state and economy, on the other, through their 
concepts of "political" and "economic societies."75) Analytically dis- 
tinguishing political from economic publics in this fashion enables 
us to show how certain publics ideally struggle to democratize state 
decision-making, while others are more concerned with justice and 
fairness in economic affairs. Only after drawing these distinctions are 
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we prepared to grasp a third kind of public, through which civil society 
has an impact communicatively back upon itself. Civil publics ideally 
seek a "communicative opening-up of the sacred core of traditions, 
norms, and authority [within civil society itself] to processes of ques- 
tioning and the replacement of conventionally based normative con- 
sensus by one that is 'communicatively' grounded."76 
Political, economic, and civil publics are open-ended flows of commu- 
nication that enable socially distant interlocutors to bridge network 
positions, formulate collective orientations, and generate psychical 
working alliances in pursuit of influence over issues of common polit- 
ical, economic, or civil concern, respectively. Settings for political 
publicity include parliaments; political parties; political clubs or asso- 
ciations; public meetings and expressions of public opinion such as 
petitions; political publications; political claim-making through rallies, 
demonstrations, and marches; and more subversive actions such as 
civil disobedience, symbolic direct action, and non-violent actions 
(e.g., hunger strikes).77 Economic publics encompass all matrices of 
communication that mediate between civil society and the economy, 
including unions; collective bargaining and grievance procedures; 
workers' associations and forms of cooperation; moral or social econo- 
mies; and structures of influence over corporate governance, consumer 
rights, and standards for exchange, banking, or accounting.78 Civil 
publics entail the communicative networks through which members of 
families, voluntary associations, and religious and educational organ- 
izations reflect back upon these institutions, make decisions regarding 
them, and self-consciously seek to shape them in concert with others, 
including through social movements, popular "cultures of resistance," 
and the development of new media or new genres of association and 
communication.79 In each case, these publics are arrayed over interac- 
tional milieux stratified by power asymmetries based upon political 
dominance, class stratification, or status hierarchies, and enjoy varying 
degrees of spatial and temporal reach and complexity. 
In the accompanying table, we situate the many varieties of publics 
that are described both by political theorists and empirical researchers 
through the organizing device of an array of publicity defined on one 
axis by asymmetries of power (ranging from subaltern to elite) and on 
the other by time-space distanciation (ranging from face-to-face to 
time-space distanced). This conceptual mapping allows us to depict a 
relational field within which a wide range of approaches to publics can 
be differentiated and compared, whether normative or descriptive, con- 
Table 1. Array of political, economic, and civil publics 
Subaltern Intermediary openings Elite 
Political 
Face-to-face Subaltern counterpublics as "parallel discursive Tocquevillean associational networks, networks Political cliques, power elites, higher circles, 
arenas" of publicity within political parties, policy networks 
parliamentary publics 
Locally Networks of subversive advocacy and resistance Publicity through marches, demonstrations, Networks of publicity through official political 
mediated through direct action, civil disobedience, hunger rallies, symbolic mobilizations rituals and parades 
strikes 
Time-space Publicity through subversive print: radical Publicity through political claim-making texts Publicity through transparancy in government: 
distanced manifestoes, pamphlets, banned publications, such as petitions and published resolutions official publications, open archives, printed 
samizdat proceedings 
Economic 
Face-to-face Worker cooperatives, worker self-management, Publicity through unions, collective bargaining, Economic cliques, old-boy networks, upper-class 
workplace democracy, rotating savings or credit open general meetings clubs, inner circles 
associations 
Locally Publicity through strikes, consumer boycotts, Publicity concerned with shareholder/consumer Business groups, industrial associations, 
mediated symbolic protest actions within proletarian publics influence, fair trade practices, cooperative corporate directorate interlocks, publics of 
banking shareholders 
Time-space Publicity through labor-oriented publications and Publicity through public accounting, open Publicity through business/financial 
distanced self-reflexive social economies disclosure, advertising standards, consumer publications, trade agreements, communication 






Publicity through popular cultures of resistance 
Time-space Underground communication networks, subaltern 
distanced reading publics, subversive artistic publics 
Publicity through reflexive self-presentation, 
alternative lifestyles, bodily self-fashioning 
Submerged networks and multi-organizational 
fields of social movements 
Publicity through alternative press, independent 
publishers, publicly-owned media 
Elite social clubs, literary salons, conference 
networks 
Publicity through civic rituals and symbolic 
status classification of insiders/outsiders -" 
Publicity in mainstream press, public institutions 
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temporary or historical. Within this framework, one can begin to think 
about how each zone of publicity relates to the others, either by ties, by 
the absence of ties, or by more indirect relational patternings. Not 
only is there a continuum of locations on the two dimensions shown, 
moreover, each public may also contain multiple orientations toward 
political, economic, or civil institutions; varied internal structures of 
social, symbolic, and psychical ties; and multiple repertoires of strategic, 
dramaturgic, or expressive modes of communication. As we turn to 
address challenges for future research, we shall be exploring the rela- 
tional contexts that create this complex architecture of publicity, as 
well as the human agency that drives it. 
Of course, in the complicated and messy interactions so often encoun- 
tered in history, collective actors typically target multiple institutional 
domains simultaneously, or else enter into coalitions with other actors 
whose goals are quite distinct from their own. Thus, forms of collective 
action within political and economic networks, aimed at expanded 
inclusion within the polity or enhancement of economic or political 
benefits, may often be found in tandem empirically with modes of 
reflexive publicity concerned more with questioning established social 
roles and identities within civil society itself. "The goal of the civil 
rights movement," for example, "was not only acquiring civil rights 
but also modernizing civil society in the sense of undoing traditional 
structures of domination, exclusion, and inequality rooted in social 
institutions, norms, collective identities, and cultural values based on 
racial and class prejudice. And the feminist movement ... takes clear 
aim at patriarchal institutions in civil society and works for cultural 
and normative change as much as for political and economic power." 80 
One crucial implication here is that political, economic, and civil pub- 
lics interpenetrate and have always done so to some extent. Even at the 
height of prototype movements for political inclusion in Europe and 
America during the early nineteenth century, one "saw an efflorescence 
of ... social movements that challenged the public/private distinction 
and brought identity politics into the forefront of the public sphere: 
utopian socialism, abolitionism, religious revival."81 As events unfolded, 
publicity surged ahead through multiple publics: political publics sought 
state democratization; economic publics promoted new principles of 
economic association, cooperation, and collective ownership; and civil 
publics sought to transform domestic arrangements, expand access to 
education, or democratize religious practices. Campaigns such as the 
abolitionist movement targeted all three institutional settings, while 
also forging ahead in the development of new techniques of public 
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communication that would bridge the spatial and temporal divides 
between far-flung Atlantic empires and their many colonies. 
These qualifications notwithstanding, however, the significant point 
remains that one grasps most fully the complexities of what is at stake 
in publicity and collective action when one distinguishes analytically 
among the various targets at which it may be oriented and the different 
institutional interstices within which it may surreptitiously take root 
and eventually emerge. This stands as one of the most important of 
all implications of the civil society and public sphere literatures for 
present-day empirical research in sociology. 
Challenges for future research 
Thus far, we have depicted the administrative-bureaucratic state, capital- 
ist economy, and civil society as structurally differentiated institutional 
sectors that are more or less autonomous from one another (depending 
upon widely varying and historically contingent circumstances), and 
that can be studied theoretically as well as empirically in terms of their 
structural interrelations. Hence, the first sections of our article were 
primarily concerned with the elaboration of a topographical model of 
modern society. In subsequent sections, we shifted toward a discussion 
of publics as more interstitial, emergent phenomena through which 
actors seek influence over the state, economy, and civil society itself. 
In this second half of the article, we introduce a new and quite different 
analytical framework, one that cuts directly across the schemas pre- 
sented earlier. We argue that institutional complexes - and publics 
themselves - can also be approached from the vantage-point of struc- 
ture, action, and agency. In fact, we present a model of three analytically 
differentiated relational contexts that, together with human agency, 
channel action within and across these various institutional sectors 
and networks of interaction. 
We argue that social action is located within and simultaneously 
shaped by a plurality of relational or structural "environments": the 
social-structural, cultural, and social-psychological. Action is enabled 
and channeled at one and the same time by all three of these trans- 
personal contexts, each of which operates according to its own partly 
independent logic, overlapping and intersecting with the others in ways 
that call for careful empirical study.82 In developing this schema, we 
follow in some respects upon a tradition of thought that goes back at 
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least as far as Parsons;83 however, we cross-fertilize this approach with 
insights from the new relational perspectives currently being developed 
by empirical researchers in the network-analytic tradition.84 Certainly, 
this line of thinking provides the unifying matrix, the central thematics, 
for all that follows. We contend that the structuring contexts of action 
(as well as agency) can be reconceptualized in relational terms, that 
we can speak of all such elements using the same relational language. 
(In light of our especially keen concern for human agency, we term this 
analytical strategy relational pragmatics.) The central insight here is 
that the very units involved in social action derive their meaning, iden- 
tity, and significance from the changing positions they fill within ongoing 
transactions. The dynamic unfolding of the transaction itself becomes 
the primary unit of analysis rather than the constituent elements them- 
selves. Such a notion allows us to move beyond the essentialism, reifica- 
tion, and categorical thinking that hinder so much sociological thinking 
today. 
The analysis of publicity, in fact, can gain much from a relational 
approach that focuses upon multiplex ties within several distinct con- 
texts of action. In the pages that follow, accordingly, we consider how 
such an approach can help to analyze differences in the constitution of 
individual publics, as well as interactions among multiple publics. The 
latter are particularly important: as Miriam Hansen puts it, "the ques- 
tion of what constitutes a [public or] counterpublic cannot be answered 
in any singular, foundational manner but [rather] is a matter of relation- 
ality, of conjunctural shifts and alliances, of making connections with 
other publics and other types of publicity."85 Actual publics must be 
understood as ever-changing, emergent, and multiple, since the inter- 
play of public expansion, contraction, and reaction to new situations 
continually elicits new genres of communication, new styles of contest- 
ation, new solidarities or enmities, and new settings for interaction. 
The empirical research strategies (all of them relational) considered 
below promise to further such understanding. New research can surely 
build upon the strengths of existing post-Habermasian perspectives: 
their stress upon the plurality of publics, their interest in the contention 
of groups with unequal social power, their expanded sense of the locales 
of publicity, and, in some cases, their explicit normative commitments. 
But the real challenge facing studies of publicity now entails finding 
ways to analyze the temporal flow of structure, action, and agency 
within multiple, intersecting, and dynamic public networks.86 
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Publics in the social-structural context of action 
We term the social-structural context of action all those social net- 
works that constitute an interpersonal, interorganizational, or trans- 
national setting of action. This is the familiar terrain of social-network 
analysis, a set of research strategies and techniques that examines how 
such elements as friendship, money, or information flow through figu- 
rations of social ties - and not always in a symmetrical fashion. 
Eschewing approaches that begin with preconstituted individuals or 
groups, as well as perspectives based upon statistical (variable-based) 
analyses, network researchers pursue transactional studies of patterned 
social relationships. They adhere to what has been called an "anti- 
categorical imperative,"87 rejecting the primacy of attributional cate- 
gories and other substantives in favor of dynamic "observable processes- 
in-relations."88 In one prominent social-network strategy, social 
"structure is described in terms of the typical relations in which indi- 
viduals are involved and the extent to which actors are connected 
within cohesive primary groups as cliques." 89 Using such an approach, 
it becomes possible to explore the topographies of relations within and 
among publics, relations interstitial vis-a-vis bounded communities or 
institutions. One does not have to presume either a unitary reified 
public sphere or a bipolar structure of "hegemonic/subaltern"; there 
may, in fact, be far more complex formations extant than either unitary 
or bipolar, whose formal features such an approach might be helpful in 
determining. (The basic insights of social-network analysis, it should 
be pointed out, can also be used profitably in a metaphorical fashion. 
Formalization merely adds power and precision to a social-structural 
analysis; it is by no means required or even always feasible.) 
Consider the prevalent notion that publicity "strengthens" through 
increases in the intensity of association, public debate, and decision- 
making. Without being self-consciously operationalized in network- 
analytic terms, this notion has become central to many studies of intra- 
and cross-national variation in levels of democratic participation. 
Alfred Stepan, for example, suggests that the 1970s democratization 
movement in Brazil "saw not only the formation of numerous new 
social movements but intricate and creative horizontal relations of 
civil society with itself, relations that helped interweave the weft and 
warp of civil society and give it a more variegated, more resistant 
fabric."90 Robert Putnam also suggests that variations in network 
density help to explain differences in civic and political life in various 
regions of Italy: "Networks of civic engagement are an essential form 
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of social capital: The denser such networks in a community, the more 
likely that its citizens will be able to cooperate for mutual benefit."91 
Both Stepan and Putnam contend that densely interlinked publics 
generate greater degrees of trust, participation, and democracy. The 
methodologies of social-network analysis allow such ideas to be more 
systematically investigated, by measuring the density of a network's 
fabric - i.e., the thickness or looseness of its weave. Defining density as 
"the proportion of possible lines that are actually present" between 
nodes of a network, one can inquire more specifically into the relation- 
ship between thickness of weave in networks of publicity and not only 
their internal vitality, but also their capacity to influence political or 
economic decision-making, or else to have an impact back upon civil 
society itself.92 (Bear in mind that the nodes in question may be either 
individuals in the case of singular publics, or publics themselves in the 
case of configurations of multiple publics; of course, the latter may in 
turn be political, economic, or civil.) 
Other research possibilities are also opened up by the study of connec- 
tivity in networks of publicity. One can, for instance, inquire into the 
routes that link various nodes within a network - the various "walks" 
or "paths" along which goods, resources, or even positions might flow 
within singular or among multiple publics - as well as their "lengths" 
and "distances." In this way, one can more adequately chart the possi- 
bilities for communication available within different public configura- 
tions.93 Such possibilities are not feasible in approaches that simply 
classify publics according to attributional categories such as plebeian 
or bourgeois.94 One can also determine the "reachability" of specific 
nodes from other nodes within a network (i.e., whether there is a path 
linking them) and, relatedly, the "connectedness" or "disconnected- 
ness" of the network as a whole (i.e., whether all pairs of nodes within 
it are reachable). A set of connected nodes that is disconnected from 
the rest of the network is termed a "component," and is important 
because it suggests a sort of "island" of publicity cut off from all other 
such matrices within a larger whole.95 In addition, one can isolate 
specific nodes or lines ("cutpoints" or "bridges") that are crucial to 
the overall connectivity of the network insofar as their removal creates 
new components within it.96 And one can look for the most "central" 
nodes within a network, the points or nodes that are most "extensively 
involved in relationships with other nodes."97 Several different network 
techniques exist for measuring actor centrality.98 
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Network-analytic ideas and techniques are also useful for inquiring 
into the "cohesive subgroups" that typically emerge within networks 
of publicity. "Cohesive subgroups are subsets of actors among whom 
there are relatively strong, direct, intense, frequent, or positive ties."99 
Studies of cohesion can reveal the ways in which boundaries develop 
among such formations that discourage the open-endedness required 
for publicity - for example, boundaries between clusters or "cliques" of 
individuals within singular publics, or between multiple publics divided 
by class, race, and so forth (e.g., working-class whites, inner-city Afri- 
can-Americans, Asian-American shopkeepers). As Calhoun observes, 
for "nearly any imaginable case there will be clusters of relatively 
greater density of communication within the looser overall field.... 
For any such cluster we must ask ... how it is internally organized [and] 
how it retains its boundaries and relatively greater internal cohesion in 
relation to the larger public."100 Here again, simplistic conceptions of 
publics as unitary or as bipolar are superseded. In the case of singular 
publics, cohesion studies can make possible the analysis of subgroups 
defined in terms of a number of different methodological criteria.101 
Cohesion defined in terms of any one of these criteria implies forma- 
tions marked by a high degree of mutual influence and pressures 
toward uniformity in beliefs, attitudes, or even social psychology. 
The same holds in the case of multiple publics or of the multiorganiza- 
tional fields so often found in the analysis of social movements. One 
major advantage of an approach that emphasizes not only the strength 
or density of ties, but also cohesive subgroups, is that it avoids reducing 
"variations in network structure to a dichotomization between hori- 
zontal (democratic) and vertical (undemocratic) ties, with the former 
defined simply by density of participation." This bears especially upon 
Putnam's study, which "eclipses the multiplicity of forms of communi- 
cation within and across networks, and especially the bridging func- 
tion of civic networks, [the latter possibly being] more important than 
'density' for understanding the development of diverse 'projects of 
citizenship."' 102 Several studies suggest that a deep structure of bridg- 
ing within and among publics (i.e., a pattern of dispersed centrality 
and numerous bridges between clusters) is more likely to be influential 
(and possibly even more democratic) than a dense but homogeneous 
public, since the former allows for a more diverse range of participants 
engaged in communicative transactions. For example, Aldon Morris's 
work on the civil rights movement explores how "the pace, location, 
and volume of protest in various communities [were] directly dependent 
on the quality and distribution of local movement centers" and on the 
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clusters surrounding them.103 And Naomi Rosenthal et al.'s work on 
women's reform movements in nineteenth-century New York State sim- 
ilarly shows how variations in reform activity depended heavily upon 
changing patterns of ties among social-movement organizations.104 
Yet another potentially illuminating line of research using network- 
analytic ideas and techniques focuses not upon the density, connectivity, 
and so forth, of social networks, but rather, upon network positions 
and role structures. The former refers to "equivalence classes" or "col- 
lections of actors who are involved in relations in similar ways," while 
the latter entails "patterns or associations among relations that link 
actors or positions."105 In such a strategy, "network structure is de- 
scribed as interlocked, differentially prestigious status/role-sets, in 
terms of which actors in a system are stratified." 06 Such an approach 
is desirable for the examination of singular publics because it allows 
for both a partitioning of these publics into classes of structurally 
equivalent individuals and for a modeling of both the relations and the 
"interrelations among relations" linking these equivalence classes.107 
An analysis of network positions and role structures is also implied 
by Fraser's discussion of multiple publics, with its heavy reliance 
upon metaphors of parallelism and opposition. Certain sets of publics 
within a matrix of multiple publics will be structurally equivalent to 
one another by virtue of their similar relations to all other publics 
within that network. And since networks themselves are multirela- 
tional, certain bundles of relations will also tend to link these "posi- 
tions." Combining Fraser's insights with positional and role analysis, 
we can study "the way in which relations among the members of a 
social system [e.g., publics within a field of multiple publics] occur in 
characteristic bundles and how these bundles of relations interlock and 
determine one another." 108 
One final strategy for social-structural inquiry into networks of publi- 
city, one that also opens out onto the question of agency and dynamic 
processes, is suggested by the concept of "structural holes," originally 
conceived by Ronald Burt as "the separation[s] between nonredundant 
contacts." Such contacts are "disconnected ... either directly, in the 
sense that they have no direct contact with one another, or indirectly, 
in the sense that one has contacts that exclude the others."109 Burt 
observes that actors "with relationships free of structural holes at their 
own end and rich in structural holes at the other end are structurally 
autonomous ... [and] best positioned for the information and control 
benefits that a network can provide." 110 In her work on Brazilian youth 
169 
politics during the 1992 impeachment crisis, Ann Mische illustrates 
this point by showing how the multiple affiliations of public actors in 
overlapping organizations and political sectors (e.g., political parties, 
religious groups, community organizations, or professional associations) 
created complex cleavage structures as well as bridging opportunities; 
in the bridging of civil coalitions, a critical role was played by "inter- 
locutors" able to construct "articulatory bridges" across partially seg- 
mented network sub-contexts."' Enhanced capacities for the self- 
organization and influence of public actors vis-a-vis state and economic 
actors can also be shown to flow to those with networks optimized 
for structural holes.112 A sensitivity to the absences (and not only the 
presences) within social networks opens up in these ways exciting 
avenues for empirical inquiry into active processes of network con- 
struction and optimization. 
Central to all of these strategies, of course, is the issue of power. Power 
is not a thing "possessed" by particular actors or publics, but rather, an 
effect of the very ways in which social networks are organized. Cut- 
points (as defined above) both within and among publics, for example, 
are significant sites of power because they represent sensitive junctures 
within flows of public communication, junctures marked by a special 
or enhanced vulnerability. Nodes of centrality are similarly important 
because those occupying them are uniquely positioned to extend their 
influence to others within their environments. If (singular or multiple) 
publics are too densely woven around a single central point, they may 
also fail to attain to maximal influence upon their targeted institu- 
tion(s); even with high degrees of trust, participation, and democracy, 
influence may actually decrease under conditions of excess central- 
ization. And finally, as shown above, structural holes are important 
because power as information and control accrues to those actors 
(individual or collective) who can recognize and exploit them within 
their public networks - can recognize "gaps and overlaps that can be 
used for agency, solidarity, and the fashioning of a common future." 113 
Publics in the cultural context of action 
Relational approaches to the sociological study of culture are not 
nearly so well developed as those concerned with networks of social 
relationships. Yet they share many of the same basic assumptions, 
beginning with the notion that cultural formations entail not individual 
"attitudes" or "values," much less disembodied "systems," but rather, 
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bundles of social communications, relations, or transactions. A rich 
plurality of such formations (even conflicting ones) can be found in 
most empirical fields of action, formations that actors are able to draw 
upon creatively and self-consciously to manipulate, just as a social- 
structural context encompasses multiple, intersecting circles of inter- 
action in the Simmelian sense.114 Studies of publics in history have 
much to gain from analyzing such formations, for, as we shall see, the 
latter often play a highly significant role in structuring communication 
flows within and across publics. Many of the leading figures in the 
study of publicity, however, have thus far failed to integrate culture 
fully into their thinking and still adhere to the reductionist view (a 
final vestige of their neo-Marxism?) that social structure is the key to 
public interactions. Indeed, as Calhoun points out, there is a remark- 
able "thinness of attention [in Habermas] to matters of culture and the 
construction of identity"; similarly, in Alexander's words, "because 
Cohen and Arato identify 'the discourse of civil society' with 'conscious' 
argument and association, they understand it in a highly limiting 
way.... [Nor do they] theorize solidarity realistically."115 Separating 
culture from social structure - that is, insisting upon their analytic 
autonomy16 - helps to overcome these theoretical and empirical defi- 
cits and allows for added precision in the analysis of publicity. Cultural 
and social structures might well constrain and enable action in different, 
even incompatible ways. While in an empirical sense, they often do fit 
together closely, analytically they must be kept distinct.117 
Some new relational methodologies in the cultural field do draw ex- 
plicitly upon the network-analytic strategies discussed above. One line 
of work features cohesion analysis, measuring the ties between "focal 
concepts" and other symbols within "semantic networks" in terms of 
their "density," conductivity," and "consensus."118 It suggests potential 
network mappings of the actual discursive schemas of specific sub- 
groups (of individual persons or of publics) and also of numerous such 
sub-groups in mutual interaction. Another line of work, meanwhile, 
pursues a structural equivalence approach to determining the formal 
structure of "discourse roles" within classificatory schemas, rhetorics, 
or other sets of cultural practices.119 Such an approach could well be 
used to map changing classifications of "public/private" or "citizen/ 
alien," revealing the underlying moral meanings and contested under- 
standings of these central social categories as they are enacted within 
institutional practices and transformed over time. 
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Still other contributions draw inspiration from non-network literatures 
and yet remain deeply compatible with network-analytic, relational 
ways of thinking. Alexander, for example, draws heavily upon Saussur- 
ian linguistics in illustrating how, in a number of episodes throughout 
American history, a linguistic code of democracy supplied "structured 
categories of pure and impure into which every member, or potential 
member, of civil society [was] made to fit.... [T]here is no civil dis- 
course," as he puts it, "that does not conceptualize the world into those 
who deserve inclusion and those who do not." 120 He and Philip Smith 
examine the binary structures that allowed certain social actors to 
be tarred with the brush of "pollution" and thereby to be effectively 
shunted off from the legitimate terrain of public action.121 And Marc 
Steinberg turns more to the "dialogic" approach of Mikhail Bakhtin in 
mapping out the "discursive repertoires" of silk weavers and their 
capitalist opponents in early nineteenth-century London.122 Bakhtin is 
highly significant for our own purposes as well, since his dialogism 
is not only eminently relational (not to mention processual), but also 
deeply compatible morally and practically with the ideals of publicity 
and open communication.123 
At least implicitly, empirical researchers have already done much to 
uncover the role of culture in structuring or channeling public action. 
Much of their work explores the exclusionary impact of linguistic 
formations. For example, Mustafa Emirbayer shows how civil publics 
seeking school reform during the antebellum and Progressive eras were 
structured in part by discourses of "virtue" and "corruption," in which 
opponents of educational change became depicted as partisan and self- 
interested, as standing "outside" the sacred center of American moral 
culture.124 And Somers, building in part upon Keith Baker's important 
work on political culture, charts the internal relational structure of the 
"Anglo-American citizenship complex" so dominant in Western polit- 
ical thought since the seventeenth century. The latter was a "meta- 
narrative," she notes, whose internal "demarcations ... hardened 
through social naturalism into temporal, spatial, and epistemological 
divides with respect to the only possible preconditions for democratiza- 
tion and freedom"; as such, these demarcations made possible invidious 
distinctions between "traditionalist" and "modern" forces in political 
life.125 Somers's work is important for demonstrating the centrality 
for cultural analysis of narrativity, defined in relational terms as "con- 
stellations of relationships ... embedded in time and space, constituted 
by... causal emplotment." 126 
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Others employ a more practice-oriented conception of culture to show 
how rational-critical debate of the sort championed by Habermas is 
specific only to empowered speech communities, insofar as it revolves 
around an individualized and universalistic orientation toward others, 
a tenor of self-mastery and objectivity, and capacities for instrumental 
rationality and contained debate. Joan Landes, for example, argues 
that the very genres of speaking that pervaded republican publics in 
France (during the period studied by Habermas) served to exclude 
women by promoting an imagery of fraternal brotherhood and 
"masculine" rationality, as opposed to the "femininity" and "corrupt 
softness" of the aristocratic salon. Implicit gender exclusions were 
embedded in these rationalist/universalist discourses, which were 
"framed from the very outset by masculinist interests and assump- 
tions." 127 Michael Warner argues that conventions of public discourse 
in colonial America privileged certain speakers over others, insofar as 
"printing constituted a specifically white community; in this sense 
it was more than a neutral medium that whites simply managed to 
monopolize."128 And Negt and Kluge show how official publics reject 
the dialogic modes of expression and thinking-out-loud that they claim 
are displayed by workers: "Within the context of the bourgeois public 
sphere, above all in school, and on television, [these are] seen as a 
digression and [are] immediately rejected."129 These sociolinguistic 
approaches to public communication recognize that stratification is 
always embedded in linguistic competences, class codes, dialects, struc- 
tures of diglossia and multilingualism, and even bodily comportment 
and gesture.130 
There are, of course, inclusionary effects as well that can be attributed 
to culture, for the very same repertoires, genres, and idioms that 
exclude certain actors from public life can also justify the belonging- 
ness of others. In fact, cultural formations often provide useful means 
of bridging distances among the latter, who might otherwise have been 
sharply separated by social-structural (or social-psychological) bar- 
riers.131 Accordingly, it becomes important to analyze the linguistic (as 
well as other) aspects of tie construction within singular publics, as 
well as of coalition-building among multiple publics. An important 
example of symbolic bridging efforts is found in social-movement 
theory's concept of "framing," as "the conscious and strategic efforts 
by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and 
of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action." 132 Here, 
as before, the oppositions set up by culture are not "real" in any sim- 
plistic sense. "Actors are not intrinsically either worthy or moral: they 
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are determined to be so by being placed in certain positions on the grid 
of civil culture." 133 (Once again, one encounters here the idea of struc- 
tural equivalence.) 
From a more practice-oriented point of view, one might also direct 
attention to the inclusionary effects of "group styles," "the taken- 
for-granted [patterns of interaction] that groups enact as they share 
texts."134 According to Nina Eliasoph and Paul Lichterman, such 
practices are "not just random improvisations on shared themes, 'codes,' 
'tools,' or 'languages,'" but are themselves patterned and structured 
ways of inflecting the very meanings of linguistic formations and poten- 
tially every bit as crucial in determining inclusion (as well as exclusion) 
as those linguistic formations themselves.135 Sharing a group style or 
practice might allow individuals or publics to work together even 
when occupying discrepant positions within social-structural (or social- 
psychological) networks - not to mention also networks of a cultural- 
linguistic nature. 
Public actors often seek to appropriate and transform cultural struc- 
tures - with all their inclusionary and exclusionary effects - through 
public contention over meaning. It is relevant here that a single cul- 
tural formation may conduce to more than one interpretation. Ron 
Jacobs shows, for example, how in response to the Rodney King crisis of 
1991, quite different publics crystallized around competing versions of 
the self-same discourse of "American democracy."136 Mutually opposed 
visions of purity and pollution, with contradictory implications for 
inclusion and exclusion, came to structure action within and among 
these publics. Along the same lines, Mimi Sheller argues that responses 
to Haiti's revolution of 1804 differed among European diplomatic 
circles, elite white publics in neighboring colonies, and Afro-Caribbean 
publics; each network of political communication assigned its own 
moral meanings to the "black republic." 137 "Discourse is essentially 
double-voiced or heteroglossic, to use Bakhtin's term ... [it] calls forth 
potentially divergent and often contradictory moral evaluations of the 
world."138 Some of the most significant divisions within the cultural 
context of public action, in fact, can emerge among rival interpreta- 
tions of a public language - alternative ways of assigning meaning 
to its core terms or ideals - rather than among altogether different 
languages or conceptual structures. On the other hand, public actors 
may also consciously attempt to delegitimate an existing conceptual 
formation by attacking its core terms, revealing contradictions, and 
offering alternatives. Here, deconstructive approaches are useful, for 
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they "undermine or disperse what have been taken to be ... texts' clear, 
normative, and intended meanings ... bringing to the surface the par- 
tially suppressed multiplicity of voices that always coexist in a text."139 
Now, the challenge becomes to avoid regarding cultural formations not 
only as static and singular, but also as internally coherent or unitary.140 
This leads us to the important question of power within cultural for- 
mations. Often, power is seen as residing exclusively "outside" of cul- 
ture: i.e., within social structure (in the way in which social networks 
are themselves configured). While this is true to an extent, power is 
also to be found "within" cultural formations; it flows from occupancy 
of certain privileged symbolic positions or nodes within them. As 
Francois Furet points out in his study of the French Revolution, 
"Power was a matter of establishing just who represented the people, 
or equality, or the nation: victory was in the hands of those who were 
capable of occupying and keeping that symbolic position." 141 If culture 
is much like a web or network (or a multiplicity of different and 
perhaps competing networks) of symbolic elements, then power de- 
rives (partially) from the capacity to identify with or to "speak in the 
name of" especially highly valued ideals within such matrices.142 Indi- 
vidual and collective agency relate closely to this: social actors pursue 
power understood in these terms just as they pursue the goods, re- 
sources, and positions available within social networks. Actors "are 
constantly working with [language] and on it, playing at its margins, 
exploiting its possibilities, and extending the play of its potential mean- 
ings, as they pursue [such] purposes and projects." 143 
Publics in the social-psychological context of action 
What we designate as the social-psychological context of action en- 
compasses all those structures that constrain and enable action by 
channeling flows and investments of psychical energy. It includes 
relatively long-lasting, durable matrices of attachment and emotional 
solidarity, as well as negatively toned currents of hostility and aggres- 
sion. The nodes in these processes-in-relations are not "positions" (as 
in the social-structural context), or "symbols" (as in the cultural), but 
rather "objects": that is to say, whole persons, aspects of persons, 
fantasized substitutes for persons, or ideals. As Sigmund Freud himself 
argues in his monograph on Group Psychology, in place of the father 
one might just as well find a leader, the nation, or some abstract 
principles.'44 Several points should be underscored here: (1) the social- 
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psychological context, no less than the others, is fundamentally trans- 
personal in nature, rather than a context of merely individual psycho- 
logical dynamics; in this respect, we differ from Parsons and his 
followers, all of whom distinguish among culture, society, and individ- 
ual personality; (2) psychical currents circulate through sets of trans- 
actions among groups and individuals; Randall Collins even uses the 
metaphor of an "emotional economy" to designate the rules governing 
such transactions;15 (3) collective psychical investments are not always 
fully available to conscious awareness; and (4) such flows can be neg- 
ative rather than positive in nature; many crucial psychical interac- 
tions are even driven by hate or aggression rather than by love. 
Promising as they are, such social-psychological insights have all too 
rarely been followed up by analysts of publicity. Recent agendas for 
research have replicated the general trend in sociology (both theoret- 
ical and empirical) awayfrom thinking systematically about collective 
psychical configurations. What one commentator suggests in respect to 
nationalism applies just as well to social action within and across pub- 
lics: "Descriptions ... note [its] passion, indeed the very pages crackle 
with it. But these descriptions do little to conceptualize, analyze, or 
interpret it."'46 Whenever experts on publicity do acknowledge its 
social-psychological dimensions, they typically characterize them as 
"cultural" phenomena on the same level as frames, genres, or discourses, 
or else as aspects of "agency," instead of seeing them as structures with 
autonomous logics that constrain and enable public action. Perhaps 
the very concern of many such writers with rational-critical communi- 
cation leads them away from theorizing the non-rational sides of 
publicity: that is, its group dynamics, leader-follower ambivalences, 
unconscious reenactments of a "family romance," and so forth. 
Yet, within the social-psychological literature, exemplary models of 
inquiry do exist that can help to guide such research; many even feature 
the network-analytic strategies discussed above. Certain cohesion 
studies, for example, investigate patterns of psychical ties among group 
members.47 And analyses of structural equivalence explore patterns of 
relationships among positions within affectual networks.148 In a less 
formalized way, other useful writings can be categorized in terms of 
Freud's key insight that group formations "are dominated by emo- 
tional ties of two kinds": those between group members and their 
leaders ("idealization") and those among members themselves ("iden- 
tification").'49 This formula itself can be seen as a point of departure 
(in metaphorical fashion) for inquiries investigating both cohesion and 
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structural equivalence. In the former category, analysts explore the 
idea that group solidarity rests in part upon aim-inhibited (i.e., not 
overtly sexual) libidinal ties of collective identification among group 
members.150 And in the category of structural equivalence, research 
into group dynamics and charismatic leadership shows how mecha- 
nisms of projective identification set up unconscious role structures 
within a group that constrain and enable members' actions, including 
those of the group leaders themselves.151 Exciting developments in 
other areas, such as the recent sociological literature on trust, are also 
highly relevant to the study of publics, as we shall see.'52 
Within singular publics, bonds of identification are crucial for provid- 
ing the foundational matrices of mutual attachment and trust without 
which no public dialogue could long persist, certainly not without 
devolving into unbridled conflict. Psychoanalytic theory sheds some 
light upon this aspect; as Freud puts it, "social feeling is based upon the 
reversal of what was first a hostile feeling into a positively-toned tie in 
the nature of an identification." 153 One can, in fact, adapt to the study 
of publics the Freudian notion of a "working alliance." As elaborated 
by W. R. Bion in his idea of a "work group," 154 this implies a constella- 
tion of social actors held together by a common commitment to the 
constructive engagement and solving of problems, despite grave differ- 
ences requiring ongoing dialogue and disputation. One can also ana- 
lyze the mechanisms of displacement and projection through which 
psychical ambivalences and aggressions within publics are shifted 
onto alternative publics: the exclusionary processes that make inclu- 
sion itself possible.155 Freudian theory, however, is only of partial use- 
fulness here, for despite such elaborations, its tendency is ultimately to 
depict bonds of identification as regressive and deindividuating. 
(Freud's own elitism in politics is closely linked to this presupposition.) 
More useful, perhaps, is the aforementioned new work on trust in civil 
society. 
Some sociological thinkers have said of trust that it is "the concept at 
the heart of a theory of civil society," that to "call for the establishment 
of civil society without taking the fundamental terms of trust ... into 
consideration is but an empty rhetorical exercise." 156 This idea applies 
all the more powerfully to publics of various sorts. For the latter, 
maybe by virtue of their interstitial character, often exhibit high de- 
grees of internal tension, insecurity, and dispute, and may also come 
under intense pressures from other publics, as well as from the better 
established social institutions - political, economic, or civil - which 
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they aim to transform. (This is especially true of counterpublics.) Thus, 
their very survival typically requires the existence of baseline senti- 
ments of mutuality and solidarity - ultimately, psychical bonds - 
among various members.'57 Recent studies by James Coleman, Ronald 
Burt and Marc Knez, and others help to demonstrate how such config- 
urations or systems of trust can be mapped out in ways analogous to 
both social and cultural networks.158 These studies, however, belong to 
a highly individualistic "interest paradigm"; their methodological in- 
novations can more profitably be deployed within an alternative theo- 
retical framework that belongs instead to the tradition of "moral sym- 
pathy" that extends back to early-modern British moral philosophy.159 
Many recent sociological studies of trust draw heavily upon this tradi- 
tion in analyzing the role played by social sentiments such as sympathy, 
empathy, and altruism in holding publics together, even in the face of 
powerful centripetal tendencies.160 
Social-psychological considerations are also useful for better under- 
standing leader-follower dynamics within singular publics. Bion notes 
the presence of such dynamics within large-scale social institutions 
such as the church, army, and aristocracy.161 This list could easily be 
expanded to include publics as well, for leaders often come to assume 
important psychical functions within such groups.162 Normative theo- 
rists' focus upon the rational-critical aspects of public communication 
ought not to erase from view the prevalence of such unconscious 
processes in publics of all kinds. Most speculatively, leaders need not 
even be part of publics themselves in order to help structure psychical 
relations within those publics. Political publics during the French 
Revolution, for example, were structured in large part by their shared 
unconcious relations with an "absent" King. As Lynn Hunt shows in 
The Family Romance of the French Revolution, the killing of the King 
and the unconscious attempt to set up in his place a "new family 
romance of fraternity" influenced the internal workings of a variety of 
publics - and ultimately shaped the course of the Great Revolution 
itself.163 And, as Emirbayer shows in "Halcyon Days," a study of 
a protest movement at the New School for Social Research, the psy- 
chical field centered around that university's powerful president did 
much to structure relations both within and among the various publics 
that arose during that movement's heyday.164 
The social-psychological point of view also has crucial implications 
for the sociological analysis of multiple publics. It allows us better to 
understand, for example, the collective emotional configurations that 
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serve to tie multiple publics closer together. Bonds of mutual identi- 
fication, however "weak" (in Mark Granovetter's sense), can overcome 
(at times) even divisions within the social-structural or cultural con- 
texts of action and help to establish clusters of publics that would not 
otherwise have formed. What Freud says about the civilizing process in 
general applies to multiple publics in particular: "The love which 
founded the family continues to operate in civilization ... in its modi- 
fied form as aim-inhibited affection. [As such], it continues to carry on 
its function of binding together considerable numbers of people, and it 
does so in a more intensive fashion than can be effected through the 
interest of work in common."165 One can also turn to the literature on 
trust for an alternative grounding for this idea of a working alliance 
among publics. For structures of trust help to coordinate divergent 
publics and provide the matrices within which their heterogeneous 
interests and identities can be funneled into a common commitment. 
While still not analyzed empirically with the same methodological 
precision as social or even cultural networks, these bonds of identifica- 
tion and mutual trust are nonetheless appealing research objects, since 
they do much to facilitate the extension of networks of publicity across 
both time and space.166 
On the other hand, psychical, non-rational forces can also sometimes 
help to keep various publics - political, economic, and civil - sharply 
separated from one another and even in conflict, despite the presence 
of social-structural and cultural formations that might otherwise have 
allowed their coming together. (Ethnic and racial differences, for 
example, often create profound rifts between otherwise compatible 
networks of publicity.167) Collective feelings of paranoia and aggression 
can drive publics far apart; "what mobilizes conflict [in these cases] - 
the energy of mobilized groups - are emotions."168 Positive affects can 
split apart from negative ones, the latter being rechanneled onto exter- 
nal, collective objects now deemed hateful and aggressive. "It becomes 
necessary... periodically to purge the body politic of those elements 
which pollute it"169 - for example, through appeals for "public order" 
and unity. What is striking and unexplainable within the terms of 
social-structural or cultural structures alone is precisely this gratuitous 
and surplus aggression (even cruelty) among publics, or between pub- 
lics and more established institutional settings and complexes. 
At stake in all of these flows and investments of psychical energy, 
needless to say, is power. For power derives not only from location 
within social-structural and cultural networks, but also from posi- 
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tioning within specifically social-psychological matrices. Just as power 
within the social-structural context of action depends upon occupancy 
of privileged nodal points within flows of information or material re- 
sources, or within the cultural context upon who "speaks in the name 
of the people," so, too, does power within the social-psychological 
domain depend upon an actor's location within networks of trust and 
identification. "Those who hold trust hold power."170 Thus, psychical 
matrices are potentially no less important for the study of power 
hierarchies and of struggles within and across publics (and between 
publics and more established institutions) than are structures within 
the other two relational contexts of action. 
Publics and human agency 
While transpersonal, relational contexts - social-structural, cultural, 
and social-psychological - both constrain and enable action, they 
cannot themselves completely determine its nature and direction. Em- 
pirical social action is a synthetic product of the channeling influences 
of the structuring contexts of action, on the one hand, and of human 
agency, on the other.171 We define agency, following Emirbayer and 
Mische, as the "engagement by actors of different structural contexts, 
which ... both reproduces and transforms those structures in interactive 
response to the problems posed by changing historical situations." 172 
Let us begin with the internal and individual-level micro-dynamics 
of publicity. It is through risky, pragmatic micro-exchanges among 
individuals - contentious engagement - rather than behind the safe, 
solitary "veil of ignorance" idealized by certain philosophers,'73 that 
bridges are forged between socially distant interlocutors and more 
democratic decisions potentially reached. Emirbayer and Mische hold 
that the concept of agency can be differentiated into a "chordal triad" 
consisting of three principal tones or orientations, any one of which 
might selectively be emphasized within a given field of action; each 
orientation is a dominant "tone" with the others also present in a 
subordinate capacity. The three categories - iteration, projectivity, and 
practical evaluation - refer to the past-, future-, and present-oriented 
modalities of agency, respectively. It is the interplay of these three 
elements over the course of collective problem-solving that helps to 
determine what kinds of publics will arise within different transactional 
settings. 
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Iteration, to begin with, refers to "the selective reactivation of past 
patterns of thought and action, as routinely incorporated in practical 
activity, thereby giving stability and order to social universes and help- 
ing to sustain identities, interactions, and institutions over time." 174 
Exemplary are the kinds of periodic or cyclical public activities often 
referred to as "public rituals." The opening of a parliamentary session, 
a commemoration of a historical event, a civic parade, or the erection 
of a monument to fallen heroes: all are instances of publicity that 
symbolically communicate an agentic orientation toward preserving 
tradition, enshrining memories, and reproducing stable identities 
through reactivation and remembrance. Performative and expressive 
types of publicity are found not only within political rituals, but also 
within economic life (e.g., from strikers' picket lines to monumental 
corporate headquarters) and within civil life (from old school ties to 
bodily decorations signifying inclusion in alternative communities).175 
While publics often feature the iterational moment, with its accentua- 
tion of the repetitive and taken-for-granted dimensions of action, pub- 
licity also involves "a creative, future- and/or present-oriented, solving 
of problems." The projective orientation of agency encompasses "the 
imaginative generation by actors of possible future trajectories of action, 
in which received structures of thought and action may be creatively 
reconfigured in relation to actors' hopes, fears, and desires for the 
future." 176 Within publics, projectivity is found most frequently in those 
protected spaces where subaltern actors formulate and debate their 
own collective visions of a transformed future: for example, in Fraser's 
"parallel arenas of counterdiscourse"; Gilroy's black counterpublics; 
moral crusades of the nineteenth century; or the millenarian move- 
ments common to post-slavery and post-colonial societies.177 Subaltern 
publics not only disembed participants from conventional networks of 
family or workplace, but they also engage in contention with other 
publics, thereby enhancing their members' opportunities for imagina- 
tive experimentation and "cognitive liberation."178 
Finally, the element of practical evaluation entails "the capacity of actors 
to make practical and normative judgments among alternative possible 
trajectories of action, in response to the emerging demands, dilemmas, 
and ambiguities of presently evolving situations." 79 Habermas's ra- 
tional-critical publics are the epitome of this agentic orientation, 
insofar as they are spaces for pragmatic decision-making and problem- 
solving in the present moment. Many theorists of republican virtue have 
devoted special attention to this element, exploring the ways in which 
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involvement in common affairs helps to cultivate in citizens certain 
capacities and dispositions toward public-spiritedness, civic commit- 
ment, and good judgment or "intelligence." From this perspective, 
practical evaluation means a more or less explicit deliberation (in 
common) over alternative means and ends.180 Practical evaluation, 
however, also opens out onto wider problems of improvisation and 
timing,181 tactics of resistance and ruse,182 and (local action).183 Choice 
"can be a matter of tacit adjustment or adaptation to changing 
contingencies ... as well as the product of articulable explicit reason- 
ing." 184 For any contention or collective decision-making to take place 
in publics, there must be some degree of movement across arrays of 
hierarchically clustered sub-networks.185 An important challenge for 
empirical research is thus to show how practical maneuvering within 
and across publics, in addition to rational-critical deliberation and dis- 
course, takes advantage of structural opportunities for breaking old 
ties or for fashioning new social-network ties, symbolic alignments, 
and psychical resonances among previously unallied actors.186 
Let us turn now to the macro-dynamics of publicity, the actual impact 
ofpublics (singular as well as multiple) upon already established institu- 
tions or institutional sectors. Here again, the concept of agency serves 
as a kind of lynchpin, allowing us to see how empirical social action - 
both constrained and enabled by a variety of structural contexts simul- 
taneously - dynamically reconfigures those contexts in interactive 
response to changing, problematic situations.187 In addition to mapping 
out the different kinds of structures - multiple, intersecting, sometimes 
overlapping - within which social action unfolds, sociological analyses 
ought to study the agentic processes through which actors engage with 
and potentially transform such structures. The concepts of iteration, 
projectivity, and practical evaluation play a role here no less critical 
than they did in the study of the micro-dynamics of publicity: they 
allow us to disaggregate agentic engagements into their different ana- 
lytic modalities. But now the relevant interactions of public actors are 
no longer exclusively with one another; the array of publics has a 
fractal geometry, for as we "zoom out," we can see the same principles 
shaping engagement and contestation with political, economic, and 
civil actors as well. Thus, "Solidarity" activists in Communist Poland 
challenged the state bureaucracy by promoting iterational orientations 
that reactivated past patterns of Christian solidarity. Revolutionary 
movements are known for their projective reconfiguration of existing 
institutions and practices through future-oriented invention of new 
calendars, names, and public rituals. And a practical-evaluative, often 
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highly tactical orientation is seen in the macro-dynamics of civil 
and political rights movements in post-slavery societies: e.g., in black 
counterpublics engaged with shifting arrays of political, economic, and 
civil actors.188 
One way in which to analyze the macro-dynamics of publicity might be 
to select particular (sequences of) "events" or "turning points" in-and- 
through which the state, economy, or civil society itself are transformed 
and to examine therein the complex interplay among structural contexts, 
empirical social action, and agency. For example, since all institutions 
encompass - are in part constituted by - a cultural dimension, one 
might examine particularly important historical junctures (events or 
event sequences) in which, through a series of public meetings or open 
communications in the mass media, public actors call into question 
and transform an official state-policy discourse. In this example, pub- 
lics might expose the incoherences at the core of this official discourse, 
taking advantage of its heteroglossic nature, as discussed above, or else 
creatively recombine elements from two or more extant idioms to 
produce a new legitimating discourse in terms of which state policies 
might be organized. A growing body of theoretical literature addresses 
such pivotal moments: Andrew Abbott, for example, in his discussion 
of turning points as "causally central shifts of regime," 189 or William 
Sewell, Jr. and Marshall Sahlins in their examinations of events as 
"that relatively rare subclass of happenings that significantly transform 
structures," 190 as "disruptions" to "the going order of things." 191 Sahlins 
adds yet another useful concept to the mix, that of "the structure of the 
conjuncture," to underscore the "dialectic of... heterogeneous" orders 
of structure and agency that unfolds within events - "with the effect of 
a structural synergy." 192 Such notions help to keep our attention fo- 
cused squarely upon interactional junctures within which far-reaching 
changes are attempted in the structuring of institutionalized social 
practices. 
Conclusion 
As we have seen, publics not only mediate among a plurality of institu- 
tional sectors and encompass the social-structural, cultural, and social- 
psychological contexts of action, but they also involve a broad array of 
agentic possibilities. The efficacy of publicity depends upon a complex 
combination of these several elements. The study of publics in history, 
we conclude, must always bear in mind all of these various dimensions. 
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The approach that we have put forward accordingly draws upon a wide 
range of insights from political science, cultural studies, and social 
psychology - as well as sociology - all of which touch upon aspects of 
public interaction and its impacts upon democratization. In this way, 
we aspire to set forth a more truly synthetic paradigm and research 
agenda for the empirical study of publicity. 
But let us mention a few disclaimers here as well. The analytical frame- 
work that we have presented is intended solely as a "sensitizing" frame- 
work,193 a matrix of concepts and distinctions, systematically inter- 
connected, that we believe might prove useful for the development of 
conjunctural causal explanations of enhanced analytical power and 
specificity. Moreover, this article represents only an early, provisional 
attempt to elaborate such a framework; hence, we present our ideas 
here only in bold strokes, without extensive empirical illustration. And 
finally, our schema is necessarily complicated; most empirical research, 
however ambitious, will not be able to take into account - nor need it 
take into account - every one of its many facets. 
Despite these disclaimers, our theoretical framework already carries 
with it a number of important implications. Analytically, its key payoff 
is to have laid out a wide array of possibilities - to have opened up 
new questions and prevented the conflation of old ones - and thereby 
to have avoided the foreclosure of otherwise promising research op- 
tions. Surely, an encompassing frame of reference remains critical for 
sharpening the causal statements that analysts of publicity will generate 
and for broadening the range of causal mechanisms that their research 
will identify. As Skocpol points out, social thinkers need always to 
"give sufficient analytic weight to the conjunctural, unfolding interac- 
tions of originally separately determined processes."194 Our schema 
allows precisely for such conjunctural arguments to be elaborated 
regarding historical causation and resonates with calls for ever more 
comprehensive analytic strategies in sociological studies. 
On a normative level as well, our framework holds important implica- 
tions for students of publicity. It suggests that the effects or outcomes 
of public interactions will potentially be found in all three of our rela- 
tional contexts of action: in the cultural and social-psychological envi- 
ronments no less than in the social-structural. A normatively desirable 
outcome of historical transformations will surely entail the democra- 
tization of all three of these structural contexts; that is, the most 
promising changes in social structure will meet with setbacks in the 
184 
long run if not also accompanied by complementary changes in cul- 
tural discourse and in collective psychical commitments. Crucial as 
well, at the level of agency, will be the cultivation of dispositions toward 
democratic reflection, deliberation, and action - toward civic virtue 
and "intelligence" in the full pragmatist sense of the term. The chal- 
lenges facing democratic actors are even more daunting than most 
analysts of publicity have heretofore realized. But for all that, those 
challenges are, in the present day, no less urgent and compelling. 
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